Does the number of political parties influence voter turnout in developing democracies? Some scholars argue large party systems facilitate matching voter preferences with a specific party, increasing turnout. Others argue multi-party systems produce too many alternatives, decreasing turnout. In developing democracies, there is debate over whether these institutions matter at all. We argue that party systems do matter for turnout in developing countries, but the relationship between turnout and the number of political parties is conditional on the electoral formula. Under proportional representation systems, large numbers of parties increase turnout. Under winner take all systems, large numbers of parties depress turnout. Since electoral rules also influence the number of parties, we use an innovative sub-national research design, taking advantage of local variation in the number of parties that is largely unrelated to the electoral system. Specifically, we test these relationships by analyzing turnout data at the municipal level in Brazil and Bolivia, countries with very different electoral rules. Overall, we find evidence that party systems influence turnout, but in different ways depending on the election rules.
INTRODUCTION
The act of voting is fundamental to democracy. Surprisingly little consensus exists, however, on what best explains the decision to vote. Most agree that some combination of institutional, socio-economic and election-specific factors are important, but a significant number of questions remain about the conditions under which these factors matter the most, particularly in developing countries. This paper focuses on one particular question: how does the number of political parties affect voter turnout in developing democracies?
Some argue that a large number of parties allows voters to select candidates/parties that embody views close to their own, increasing turnout. Others argue additional parties flood the electoral process with too much information, making it difficult for voters to choose between options, thereby depressing turnout (Downs 1957; Jackman 1987) . To further complicate matters, large numbers of political parties at the national level are often associated with proportional representation (PR) and indirect selection of the executive through parliamentary procedures. Conflating the two makes it difficult to determine whether PR or the number of parties is affecting voter turnout. Under PR rules, the threshold for representation tends to be lower for individual parties, increasing the sense that votes matter, therefore boosting turnout.
However, others argue that the coalition formation between small parties that often accompany PR elections with large number of parties obscure the choices for voters and drive turnout down (Downs 1957) .
We argue that these theoretical contradictions in the literature can be reconciled with attention to an important contextual variable: the electoral formula. Under electoral formulas where relatively few votes are wasted (PR voting rules, for example), an increase in the number of parties should increase turnout: people can support politicians close to their ideal points without throwing their votes away. Under electoral rules where a relatively large number of votes are wasted (first past the post rules, for example), an increase in the number of parties should have the opposite effect: although increasing choice, a large number of parties lowers the probability that any single one will win office, discouraging voter turnout.
It is difficult to determine the relative influence of parties and electoral systems in crossnational studies because country-level electoral rules have a clear effect on the number of parties.
We propose a unique research design to establish whether the number of parties increases or decreases turnout. We collected data on municipal level elections in Brazil and Bolivia during two very similar rounds of elections in both countries. The design allows us to do two things: 1) vary the number of parties participating in an election while holding constant the electoral system; 2) explicitly test whether the number of parties and their impact on turnout is affected by the difference in the electoral formula employed in the Bolivian and Brazilian mayoral elections.
As expected, we find a strong positive relationship between the number of parties and turnout in Bolivia, but a strong negative relationship between the number of parties and turnout in Brazil.
These findings are interesting for the debate over party systems and voter turnout, but they also speak to a larger debate over the importance of political institutions in developing democracies. Many scholars register skepticism concerning electoral rules and their importance in contexts that witness significant problems like corruption, electoral access, and clientelist power brokering. Our results suggest that political institutions hold significant consequences.
Voters and political parties respond to rational incentives-even in the context of relatively new democracies like Bolivia and Brazil. In Latin America, large numbers of political parties have been seen as a pathology of weak and fractionalized party systems. We argue, however, that weak political parties are not the whole story: voter participation hinges on the value voters and parties place on each individual ballot. Electoral laws designed to maximize each individual vote are crucial to fostering democratic participation.
PREVIOUS WORK
Political institutions are important determinants of cross-national variation in turnout among established democracies (Powell 1980; Jackman 1987) . A growing number of scholars argue institutions matter for turnout in developing countries (Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Kostadinova and Power 2007; Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Lehoucq and Wall 2004; Perez-Linan 2001; Kuenzi and Lambright 2007) . Although some agreement exists on the important role institutional rules play in determining turnout (e.g., compulsory voting rules tend to increase voter turnout), there is much less agreement on multipartism, electoral rules and voter turnout.
For example, scholars debate whether winner-take-all (SMD) or proportional representation (PR) schemes generate higher levels of participation. Most find PR promotes participation (Powell 1980; Andre Blais and Carty 1990; Franklin 2004; Jackman and Miller 1995; Radcliff and Davis 2000; Norris 2002 ). However, the mechanisms driving the result are less understood (Brockington 2004; Blais 2006) . Although higher rates of turnout are associated with PR, one of its central features (relatively large party systems) seems to decrease voter turnout. In one of the foundational studies on multipartyism and turnout, Robert Jackman (1987) found a strong, negative relationship between the number of parties and turnout among 19 industrialized democracies. Jackman explained the result by relying heavily on Anthony Downs' insights into multiparty systems (Jackman 1987, p. 408) . Since there is a high correlation between multipartyism and coalition government, voters may be discouraged from participating when the actual formation of government is only indirectly under their control (Downs 1957 ).
For Downs, it was entirely possible that a voter would "be so befuddled…that he stays home on election day" (Downs p. 152) .
Preliminary evidence indicates that coalitions are not the culprit: systems that produce single-party majority governments do not have higher rates of turnout (Blais and Carty 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998) . Individual-level data collected in the industrialized democracies also demonstrates that strong partisans-those who would lose most when their parties enter unwieldy coalitions-feel just as efficacious when voting in the context of coalitions (Brockington 2004) . And in presidential elections where "multipartism in the race does not translate into multipartism in the office, because only one candidate wins… the presence of many candidates still makes it more difficult for voters to discern the policy implications of their vote" (Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer 2009, 1327) . Nevertheless, even with these additional studies, a recent reviewer and significant contributor to the field writes "The bottom line is that we have a poor understanding of the relationship between the number of parties and turnout" (Blais 2006, 118) .
Although the bulk of empirical research on turnout (most of which has studied advanced democracies) finds a positive relationship between PR and higher turnout, this trend is less evident in Latin America than it is in Europe (Blais and Aarts 2006) . This relationship, however, is not the primary focus of our paper. Rather, we are interested in the relationship between the number of parties and turnout. Although PR systems often have a greater number of parties, very few studies have investigated how the number of parties influences turnout. Jackman's (1987) study is an exception in that it does directly address this question -finding that higher numbers of parties are associated with lower turnout. Others, like Powell (1982) , find that other features of political parties such as linkages to social groups matter for turnout, but the number of parties is not central.
Our contribution, then, is to explore how the number of parties on the ballot affects voter turnout under different electoral formulas. This focus addresses the puzzling finding that PR systems tend to have higher turnout than majoritarian electoral systems yet the number of parties does not seem to increase turnout (despite being a prominent feature associated with PR systems). This puzzle -and the question of how number of parties shapes turnout -has been identified by experts on the voter turnout literature (Blais 2006; Blais and Aarts 2006) , and is important for understanding the causal links between electoral formula, party systems, and turnout. Rather than focusing on turnout at the national level in PR versus majoritarian systems, we focus on the relationship between number of parties and turnout in local elections. Overall, the relationship between number of parties and turnout is much less established in the existing literature than the relationship between PR and turnout. This is partly because fewer studies have directly looked at this (again, Jackman 1987 is an exception). More importantly, in cross-national studies of turnout it is very difficult to separate out the causal effect of the electoral formula from the causal effect of number of parties since we know electoral formulas strongly influence the number of parties competing (Duverger 1954) .
The subnational comparison of local elections in Brazil and Bolivia that we employ helps solve this problem. Although the political party system in each country is clearly related to the electoral rules, variation in the number of parties in local elections cannot be the result of the electoral formula since all local elections follow the same electoral formula. Although Brazil tends to have higher overall turnout than Bolivia, we exploit variation in the number of parties in local elections that cannot be attributed to the electoral formula (which is constant in each country). This research design allows us to explore the effect of number of parties on the ballot in a context where the number of parties is not directly the result of the electoral formula.
THEORY
We argue that the number of parties in an election has varying effects on voter turnout depending on the electoral formula. In other words, the impact the number of parties has on turnout is conditional on the electoral formula. More importantly, these incentives vary with the electoral system. In a proportional system, parties have an incentive to mobilize core supporters and fringe supporters, since both might result in more seats. In a majoritarian system, parties need only mobilize up to a certain threshold. Elections vary on many dimensions that can affect the value of each individual vote (district magnitude, overall levels of participation, or restrictions on the franchise, for example), but we focus on the clear distinction between proportional and majoritarian voting. Although there may be variation in the value of each vote in different elections, it is clear that on average individuals' votes count more in proportional elections than in majoritarian elections.
Under conditions of proportional representation in local elections, then, we expect that the number of political parties in the contest will be positively associated with voter turnout.
Since many parties can win representation on the council, the threshold to representation is relatively low, meaning that many parties can run and reasonably gain enough votes to get a seat.
In this environment, larger numbers of parties allow voters to support candidates closer to their ideal point. In majoritarian municipal elections, we expect the opposite effect. 303). The proportional system does encourage more parties to participate in city council elections relative to mayoral contests.
The essential difference, however, between Brazilian mayoral elections and their
Bolivian counterparts is that the mayor is directly elected by the population, in Bolivia the mayor is chosen indirectly. Under these conditions, the number of political parties has a very different effect on voter turnout. As the number of parties increases, smaller parties face a decreasing chance of reaching the winning threshold. Unlike PR systems, there is no compensation of winning seats on the council; the candidate either wins or loses the election. Consequently, an increase in the number of parties in a local election of this type reduces voter turnout, as voters realize the chances of their favored candidate winning the election is small. the highest averages were in La Paz (64.2%), the capitol, and Oruro (71.7%), a municipality a few hours away. The lowest averages were found in more rural and sparsely populated areas, both in the Amazon, (Beni, 58.7%), and in the Andean highlands (Potosi, 59.7%).
Because we are interested in the number of parties, we chose to use the raw number of parties competing in each election as our main independent variable. We decided to use the number of parties rather than the effective number of parties (ENP) since ENP entails combining the number of parties with the vote share. By combining vote share with the number of parties, it would be difficult to ascertain whether the party structure of local elections and its impact on turnout was being driven purely by the number of choices voters had or the level of competition in the race. We prefer the number of parties as a measure because it is a simple and direct measure of the choices that voters are confronted with on a ballot. We believe this measure best captures the variation we are interested in. We do, however, recognize that many studies prefer the use of the effective number of parties as a measure. As a robustness check, we also estimated the models for 2004 using the effective number of parties 5 in place of number of parties and find very similar results in both sign and significance. The effective number of parties and the raw number of parties for both countries in 2004 are also highly correlated (.85), giving us further confidence that our measure is appropriate.
Our analysis consists of estimating regressions for all the municipalities within each country separately (Models 1 and 2), Finally, since Brazilian states and Bolivian provinces feature distinct political processes even when compared within each country, we clustered errors by state/province. We know that a number of socio-economic variables are important determinants of turnout, both in cross-national comparisons and in comparisons of local elections. We include these as control variables. In particular, turnout is higher among more educated citizens (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Blais 2000) . Turnout is also higher in districts with smaller populations (Powell 1982; Blais and Carty 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998) , although it is less clear how population size or district size affects turnout in local elections (Blais 2006; Oliver 2000) . The context of the election itself is also important. Very close electoral competitions tend to drive higher turnout, as people interpret their vote as 5 We calculate the effective number of parties using vote share according to the formula proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) .
potentially having a greater impact on the outcome of the election (Blais 2000, 60) . 6 For the competition variable we simply took the margin of victory (the difference between the winning vote getter and the second place finisher). Given both countries' history with democratization, we included the number of votes for leftist parties since their strategies typically tend to emphasize mobilization relative to more conservative parties. Essentially, we wanted to be able to distinguish between increased turnout that was due to the number of parties and an increased turnout that was primarily the result of mobilization from one side of the political spectrum. In order to compare differences between Bolivia and Brazil, we also estimate fully interactive models that register the differences between Bolivia and Brazil (Model 3) and the differences between the border region and the municipalities elsewhere in both countries (Model 4). In the fully interactive models every independent variable is interacted with a Brazil/Bolivia dummy or a dummy that indicates whether the state or province lies on the border between Bolivia and
Brazil. The following is the fully interactive model:
6 Cox (1988) makes the case that margin of victory can be spuriously correlated with turnout and recommends using raw vote margin when comparing districts of equal population. In our case, the population size varies widely between municipalities and we believe that percentage margin is more appropriate. 7 Although votes for the left variable was statistically significant in the basic model (Model 1), its inclusion or exclusion in the model had very little impact on the other estimates. As an additional test of our argument -that the number of parties has different effects under different electoral rules because of the structure of incentives -we also compare municipalities with close elections to those with little or no political competition. Electoral contests where there is more political competition are likely to attract the attention of both political parties and voters. If our hypothesis that calculations to vote and to mobilize voters depends on the value of each vote, we would expect to observe that the number of parties and its impact on turnout in Bolivia (where votes also count towards producing a city council) does not vary between competitive and uncompetitive races. In Brazil, however, where plurality reigns, we would expect the number of parties to have a very different relationship with turnout depending on the competitiveness of the race.
RESULTS
We start by estimating the effect of the number of parties on voter turnout in separate regressions for the 310 municipalities in Bolivia (see Model 1 in Table 2 ), and 5290 municipalities in Brazil (Model 2 in Table 2 Brazil, the effect is the opposite.
To test the significance of these differences, we estimated a fully interactive model which allows both the slopes and intercepts to vary between Brazil and Bolivia for each independent variable. In the fully interactive model, Model (3), we find the relationship between the number of parties and turnout in Bolivia is statistically significant. As expected from the separate regressions in Models 1 and 2, Income, votes for the Left, and the number of parties all show significantly different relationships in Bolivia and Brazil.
To gain a better understanding of the substantive significance of the relationship between the number of parties and voting turnout in the two countries, we generated predicted values for each country as the number of parties ranges from its minimum value to its maximum, using the fully interactive model and holding all other variables constant at their mean values (see Figure   1 ). As the lines on the graph indicate, the relationship between number of parties and voter turnout is much stronger in Bolivia than in Brazil, in addition to working in the opposite direction. In Bolivia, an increase in the number of parties is associated with a fairly substantial change in turnout. In Brazil, the slope is negative and relatively flat. According to Figure 1 , at roughly one standard deviation below the mean (4 parties), Bolivia observes turnout in municipal elections of roughly 60 percent of the eligible population. At the mean, there is an increase of roughly four percentage points. Finally, at one standard deviation above the mean, roughly 69 percent of the Bolivian population goes to the polls: a nine percentage-point increase from one standard deviation below the mean. As the confidence intervals indicate, the errors around the predicted values are fairly small (the grey-shaded areas surrounding the two lines). The dramatic difference between the slope of the Brazilian and Bolivian regression lines holds an important implication worth mentioning. Given the sub-national nature of the data, we can say that there is a direct correlation between the number of parties and turnout in Bolivia, but this is highly contingent on the electoral system. Unless we distinguish between the different contexts under which these conditions operate, the relationship between the number of parties and turnout will remain obscured.
It is also clear from Figure 1 that overall turnout is higher in Brazil than it in Bolivia. In fact, average turnout across all municipalities in 2004 in Brazil is 88 percent; in Bolivia in the same year it is 62 percent. The conventional wisdom is that turnout is usually higher in PR systems such as Bolivia than in majoritarian systems such as Brazil, so this difference deserves some explanation. First, it is important to point out our research is aimed at explaining variation at the local level in both countries precisely because that internal variation cannot be attributed to the national level electoral rules or party system. It is more than likely, however, that the overall differences between the two countries are related to the national electoral rules and party system.
Brazil's national elections -unlike the local elections -are held using "open-list" proportional representation. Bolivia's national elections run according to a mixed system in which some representatives are chosen proportionally and others are chosen through plurality rules. The difference in national averages, then, may partly be due to differences in national electoral formulas, which are more proportional in Brazil. Figure 2 illustrates the partial regression plots by country, giving another image of these differences.
Another possibility is that other features of both the electorate and the rules associated Table 2) with incumbency measures. We found that the incumbent party winning in Brazil had a positive and significant impact on turnout, but it had no impact on the number of parties variable (the variable of interest). In Bolivia, the incumbent variable was not significant and its inclusion had no impact on the positive relationship between the number of parties and turnout. 
Political Competition
Thus far we have demonstrated that the number of parties has very a different effect on voter turnout in Bolivian municipalities and Brazilian municipalities. We have argued that differences in the electoral system create varying incentives for political parties and voters, which explain the difference. In Bolivia, even small parties with no chance at winning the mayor's seat can gain a place on the city council, giving incentives to small parties to mobilize their voters, and for voters to bother voting. In Brazil, while small Brazilian parties may gain from placing a candidate in the municipal legislative body, the winner-take-all nature of mayoral races means that small political parties have little to gain from mobilizing voters, and voters have little to gain from casting their ballots.
As a further test of this argument, we explore several additional implications. First, if our argument is true, we should also observe differences between Brazil and Bolivia in terms of how the closeness of the election affects the relationship between number of parties and voter turnout because of the difference in the value of each vote. In Brazil we should see a stronger negative relationship between number of parties and voter turnout in municipalities with low levels of political competition. That is, the greater the probability of electoral loss (measured by the size of the margin between the two largest political parties), the more likely it is that political parties conserve their resources by not attempting to mobilize voters, and the more likely that voters will decide to stay home rather than vote for a lost cause. Second, in Bolivia, we expect there to be little difference between competitive and uncompetitive races, since even under conditions of low competition, smaller parties can gain some degree of representation or a role in selecting the next mayor.
To test these secondary hypotheses, we estimate our main model with an interaction for political competition. If there was a larger than 3% difference between the two largest parties, the race was considered uncompetitive, if there was a smaller than 3% margin, the race was considered competitive. 9 Table 3 shows the results for Bolivia (model 1) and Brazil (model 2).
For easier interpretation, we have also graphed the predicted values of voter turnout against the number of political parties in competitive and uncompetitive municipalities for Brazil (see Figure   3 ) and for Bolivia (see Figure 4) .
As expected, the negative relationship between number of parties and turnout in Brazil is significantly stronger in uncompetitive races. In Bolivia, on the other hand, there is very little difference between competitive and uncompetitive races: voter turnout increases with the number of political parties in both types of municipalities.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper explores the influence of the number of parties in an election on voter turnout in two very different local electoral systems. We argue that the effect of the number of parties on turnout must be understood in the context of the electoral rules. Where voters have a wider range of choices combined with a good chance their favored party will win some representation, we expect an increase in turnout. However, where voters have a wider range of choices, but only one party can win, we expect a decrease in turnout. Our test of these hypotheses in the context of municipal elections in Bolivia and Brazil yields promising results. We find that under electoral systems that resemble parliamentary systems (party list voting, proportional representation on the city council, and the mayor chosen by the plurality party) an increase in the number of parties increases voter turnout. However, under an electoral system that resembles presidential systems (with direct plurality voting for the mayor) an increase in the number of parties decreases voter turnout.
In Bolivia, the implication is that a greater number of parties at the local level has a positive effect on turnout. We can see evidence of this in the four-point boost in turnout between the 2000 and 2004 municipal elections that followed a change in electoral rules to allow many more local political groups to organize and run in local elections. Since 2004, however, the MAS party has consolidated power at all levels of politics, and the majority of the older establishment political parties have collapsed. If this trend continues, and it results in fewer parties running in local elections, we may see a decline in voter turnout.
In Brazil, the implication is that a greater number of parties at the local level has no effect on turnout. A great deal has been made of Brazil's party system and the impact it has on representation, accountability, and democracy itself (Mainwaring 1995) . These results indicate that at the local level, the nature of the party system (as measured by the number of parties), has no perceptible impact on turnout. It is less clear how the incentives created at the local level by electoral formula and the number of parties are related to national level elections and political parties. We note that overall higher levels of turnout in Brazil may be related to electoral rules at the national level (as well as things like level of development and enforcement of compulsory voting laws). Our research design, however, allows us to hold constant those inter-country effects. By estimating models at the sub-national level in each country, we can hold that variable constant and examine the relationship between number of parties and turnout. While the differences that exist between
Brazil and Bolivia could lead to a shift in the intercept, since the local elections are nonconcurrent with the national elections, we can think of no obvious reasons why the national electoral system would influence the functional relationship between the number of parties and turnout. At the very least, since local elections are non-concurrent with national elections, the national election's impact on turnout should be equally muted in both countries. Understanding how local and national factors interact to shape political participation is, however, a promising agenda for future research. 
